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A corrupt transaction is often the result of bargaining between the
parties involved. This paper models bribery as a double auction where
a private citizen and a public o¢ cial strategically interact as the po-
tential buyer and the potential seller of a corrupt service. Individu-
als di⁄er in the internalized moral cost generated by corruption, and
may have only imperfect information on others￿moral cost, i.e. their
￿corruptibility￿ . This paper investigates the role that imperfect infor-
mation with respect to the ￿corruptibility￿of one￿ s potential partner
in corruption plays in his or her propensity to engage in bribery, and,
consequently, the equilibrium level of corruption in a society. We ￿nd
that corruption is lower when potential bribers and potential bribees
are uncertain regarding each other￿ s ￿corruptibility￿ . This paper pro-
vides therefore theoretical support to anti-corruption strategies, such
as sta⁄ rotation in public o¢ ces, aimed at decreasing the social close-
ness of bribers and bribees.
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11 Introduction
Corruption is usually de￿ned as an ￿abuse of public power for private gain￿ .
Bribery is typically referred to as an illegal provision of public services or
goods in exchange for private monetary compensations. According to both
de￿nitions, the potentially corrupt people in a society are the providers of
public services, i.e. the public servants. This might explain why economic
theories of corruption have mainly focused on the supply side of the corrup-
tion market (the providers￿side).
One signi￿cant portion of the theoretical literature has employed principal-
agent-client models to investigate ways for a benevolent principal to mon-
itor the moral hazard of the public servants (following Becker and Stigler,
1974, Rose-Ackerman, 1978, and Klitgaard, 1988).1 A number of more re-
cent studies has modelled corruption as a frequency-dependent phenomenon,
subject to strategic complementarities in the public o¢ cials￿economic in-
centives [Andvig and Moene (1990), Cadot (1987) and Lui (1986)]; these
models assume that when corruption is widespread, the likelihood that a
public o¢ cial will act corruptly is relatively high, due to the lower cost of
being caught and punished, and the higher chance of ￿nding a corruption
partner.2
The existing theories of corruption do not usually take into account the
role that intrinsic motivations or moral costs may play on one￿ s decision
to act corruptly; when they do [Klitgaard (1988) and Andvig and Moene
(1990)] they focus on the supply side of the market only. However, bribery
involves not only the ￿sellers￿of illicit public services or goods, but also the
￿buyers￿ , i.e. private citizens (or ￿rms), and each individual in a society
is exposed, to some extent, to behavioral rules and socialization processes;
therefore, intrinsic motivations are likely to a⁄ect both the supply side and
the demand side of any corrupt transaction. Moreover, like economic incen-
tives, intrinsic motivations may be subject to strategic complementarities:
the more people obey a norm, the more likely it is for an individual to in-
ternalise that norm.3 This paper focuses on the demand and the supply
1Note that in real life those in power, i.e. the principals, are usually not as benevolent as
these models assume, since they are often those who can bene￿t the most from corruption.
2See Bardhan (1997) for a review of the most recent theories of corruption.
3For formal models see: Akerlof, G. (1980), Cavalli-Sforza, and Feldman (1981), and
Boyd and Richerson (1985). Tirole (1996) also studies corruption as a ￿societal phenom-
enon￿(page 2), however he adopts a multi-generational approach where one￿ s decision to
act corruptly positively depends on the level of corruption among the elder members of
the same group due to inherited reputation in matters of corruption.
2side of the corruption market by: 1) investigating the decision to engage in
corruption of both public o¢ cials (potential bribees) and private citizens
(potential bribers) and 2) allowing for the presence of strategic complemen-
tarities in the extrinsic incentives and the intrinsic motivations of potential
bribers and bribees.
Recent empirical micro-evidence (Svensson, 2003, and Reinikka and Svens-
son, 2003) suggests that the amount of the bribe paid by a citizen or a ￿rm
is often the result of bargaining between the parties4; this would explain
within-country and within-sector variations in both the frequency of cor-
rupt transactions and the amount bribed in exchange for a certain service.
Following this recent empirical literature, this paper models bribery as a
double auction where a private citizen and a public o¢ cial strategically in-
teract as the potential buyer and the potential seller of a corrupt service.
This setting also makes it possible to explore the micro-determinants of cor-
ruption without having to assign the role of ￿initiator￿of the transaction to
either the briber or the bribee. Instead, we can investigate the conditions
under which both parties are willing to engage in or abstain from corruption.
Models of corruption with strategic complementarities typically main-
tain the assumption of perfect information among the parties. On the con-
trary, principal-agent-client models of corruption always point at imperfect
information as an important cause of corruption, however they only refer to
imperfect information on the part of the principal with respect to the actions
and/or morality of the agent (Klitgaard, 1988). Empirically, a few recent
micro-based studies of corruption have shown that imperfect information on
the demand side ￿typically in the form of uncertainty with respect to the
amount to be bribed ￿has a negative impact on the probability that any
￿rm will pay a bribe (Herrera and Rodriguez, 20035) and a country￿ s overall
level of corruption (Lambsdor⁄, 2007).
We address this issue theoretically by investigating the role that imper-
fect information with respect to the corruptibility (or moral cost) of one￿ s
opponent plays out in his or her willingness to engage in bribery, and, con-
sequently, the equilibrium level of corruption in the society.We ￿nd that
when agents are uncertain about the intrinsic corruptibility of their poten-
tial corruption partner, they are less likely to engage in corruption. This
translates into a lower probability that society will end up in a systemic
4This seems to be especially true where corruption is not yet systemic, or ￿organized￿ .
See Shleifer and Vishny (1993).
5Using ￿rm-level data from the Business Environment Survey they show that ￿pre-
dictable and e⁄ectual corruption regimes increase the frequency of bribery and the total
monetary cost of corruption to ￿rms￿ .
3￿corruption trap￿ ; additionally, when individuals are uncertain about each
other￿ s corruptibility, any anti-corruption policy is more e⁄ective in reduc-
ing corruption. This is especially true when the briber and bribee di⁄er in
their bargaining power over the amount to be bribed. It is reasonable to
think that bribers and bribees who do not know each other are more likely
to be uncertain about their opponents￿intrinsic corruptibility; thus, we can
draw two main policy conclusions from our ￿ndings. First, decentralizing
public service provision to the local administrative level may have adverse
e⁄ects on corruption, as it would reduce the social distance between poten-
tial bribers and potential bribees; second, anti-corruption strategies, such as
sta⁄ rotation in public o¢ ces, may be highly e⁄ective in reducing corrup-
tion, since they would lower the likelihood that citizens and o¢ cials know
each other.6
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our double auction
model of bribery and Section 3 derives the corruption equilibria under per-
fect information. Section 4 introduces imperfect information with respect to
one￿ s opponent￿ s moral cost and compares the results obtained under perfect
and imperfect information. Section 5 concludes with a summary of the main
￿ndings and policy implications.
2 A double auction model of bribery
We model bribery as a transaction between a private citizen and a public
o¢ cial for the illegal provision of a public service or good, such as, for
instance, the cancellation of a ￿ne or the provision of a license undercutting
some of the legal requirements. A corrupt agreement involves the payment
of a bribe by the private citizen and the provision of the illicit service by the
public o¢ cial.7 We focus on collusive corruption, i.e. a transaction which
6Sta⁄ rotation has been recently presented as an e⁄ective anti-corruption measure. See
Ali (2000) for a successful example of reduction in corruption following the introduction of
sta⁄-rotation in Singapore. Sta⁄-rotation is usually thought of as a way to break long-term
corruption relationships between regular bribers and bribees and introduce uncertainty
about the trustworthiness of one￿ s potential corruption partner. Using data from a bribery
experiment, Abbink (2004) shows that sta⁄ rotation could indeed be an e⁄ective way
to control corruption in situations where briber and bribee repeatedly interact. Our
approach is partially di⁄erent, as we focus on one-shot bribery transactions. Here, the
potential relevance of sta⁄ rotation in public o¢ cices relies on the possibility to introduce
uncertainty regarding the intrinsic corruptibility of one￿ s potential corruption partner,
keeping the assumption that if a bribe is paid the corrupt service is delivered.
7Note that this setting excludes the possibility for the o¢ cial to take the bribe and
not provide the corrupt service. In this way we exclude the level of trust between the
4bene￿ts both the briber and the bribee, rather than extortionary corruption.
We assume that citizen and o¢ cial have independent private valuations
of the corrupt transaction, based on the costs and bene￿ts generated by
the exchange. The total cost generated by corruption comprises both the
intrinsic moral cost that an individual may su⁄er from acting corruptly
and the expected cost of receiving formal and/or informal sanctions. We
assume that the probability that a corrupt individual will be caught and
sanctioned is subject to strategic complementarities: the more people are
corrupt the less likely it is for a corrupt individual both to be detected and
to receive formal and informal sanctions. Therefore, we de￿ne the total cost
of corruption su⁄ered by an agent i, ci, as:
ci(x) = ai ￿ x,
where: ai represents an internalized moral cost and we assume it is uni-
formly distributed over the interval [1, a], and x is the proportion of corrupt
people in the population, i.e. the people who actually paid or received a
bribe in exchange for a corrupt service, with 0 ￿ x ￿ 1: Expected punish-
ment enters the cost function through the endogenous variable x, due to our
assumption of strategic complementarities. It follows that corruption has a
cost for any individual unless he or she is intrinsically corrupt and the whole
society is corrupt, i.e., ai = 1 and x = 1.
The citizen￿ s private valuation of the corrupt transaction, which we call
vb, where the su¢ x b stands for ￿buyer￿of the corrupt service, is equal to
the monetary bene￿t she would gain from the illicit service, y, minus the
cost generated by corruption, cb:
vb = y ￿ ab + x,
with y ￿ 1: Note that vb also represents the citizen￿ s ￿reservation bribe￿
for the corrupt service, i.e. the highest bribe that she is willing to pay in
exchange for the illicit service.
The o¢ cial￿ s private valuation, which also corresponds to his ￿reserva-
tion bribe￿ , vs, where the su¢ x s stands for ￿seller￿of the corrupt service, is
equal to the cost he would have to sustain in order to provide the illicit ser-
vice (for example the administrative cost and the cost of hiding or falsifying
documents), q, plus the total cost generated by corruption,8 cs:
briber and the bribee from the analysis. Trust is an important issue especially for grand
corruption, where corrupt agreements are more likely to have a long-term nature and tend
to repeatedly take place among the same corruption partners.
8The bribe is simply a transfer of money from the citizen to the o¢ cial.
5vs = q + as ￿ x.
Note that the cost of providing the corrupt service, q, is lower the higher
the discretionary power of the o¢ cial, and the more vague or complex the
rules and the regulations associated with the service.
Citizen and o¢ cial simultaneously decide the amount of the bribe, if
any, that they would be willing respectively to pay and take in order for the
corrupt transaction to occur. These bribes correspond to sealed bids in a
traditional double auction, where the private citizen is the buyer and the
public o¢ cial is the seller of the service.
A corrupt transaction occurs if and only if the bribe ￿submitted￿ by
the private citizen, bb, is higher than or equal to the bribe ￿submitted￿by
the public o¢ cial, bs. If the conditions for a transaction to take place are
met, the citizen and the public o¢ cial negotiate the ￿nal amount of the
bribe in the range of mutually agreeable bribes. The ￿nal bribe is equal
to b = kbb + (1 ￿ k)bs, with 0 ￿ k ￿ 1 (see Chatterjee and Samuelson,
1983). The parameter k represents the bargaining power of the private
citizen relative to the bargaining power of the public o¢ cial. When k = 1
we can think of a situation where the private citizen ￿submits￿a bribe equal
to bb, which the public o¢ cial will accept without the possibility to negotiate;
when k = 0 we can think of a situation where the public o¢ cial ￿submits￿a
bribe equal to bs which the private citizen will pay without the possibility to
negotiate. It is reasonable to assume that k depends negatively on the total
number of citizens demanding the service relative to the total number of
public o¢ cials supplying the service. In other words, the bargaining power
of each private citizen is likely to be smaller the higher the competition for
the service among the citizens and the lower the competition for the service
delivery among the public o¢ cials.
Next, we investigate the equilibrium levels of corruption when citizens
and o¢ cials have perfect information with respect to each other￿ s corrupt-
ibility, i.e., their intrinsic moral cost. Subsequently, we introduce imperfect
information in the corruptibility of one￿ s potential corruption partner (Sec-
tion 4).
3 Bribery under perfect information
Consider a society where citizens and o¢ cials can perfectly observe their
opponent￿ s private valuation of a corrupt transaction. In other words, each
citizen knows the minimum bribe that the o¢ cial would be willing to take
in exchange for the corrupt service, and each o¢ cial knows the maximum
6bribe that the citizen would be willing to pay in exchange for the corrupt
service. Therefore, a corrupt transaction takes place if and only if the private
citizen￿ s valuation for the corrupt service is larger than (or equal to) the
public o¢ cial￿ s valuation:
vb = y ￿ ab + x ￿ q + as ￿ x = vs:
If the condition above is met, the citizen and the public o¢ cial will each
submit a bribe, bb and bs, which represent the maximum and minimum bribe
that they are willing to pay and take, where bb ￿ vb and bs ￿ vs. In this
game, any bribe between vs and vb can be sustained as an equilibrium; the
￿nal bribe will depend on the citizen￿ s and o¢ cial￿ s bids and their relative
bargaining powers. Since here we worry about the existence of corruption
only (and not about the size of the bribe), we can restrict attention to
following condition for corruption to take place, which, rearranging from
above, becomes:
as + ab ￿ y ￿ q + 2x: (1)
Those private citizens and public o¢ cials whose combined moral costs
are lower than the total gains from corruption agree on a corrupt transac-
tion. This is more likely to happen the larger the monetary bene￿t that the
private citizen receives from the transaction, the lower the administrative
cost the public o¢ cial needs to sustain to provide the corrupt service (higher
discretionary power) and the higher the proportion of corrupt people in the
population, as the probability of being detected and formally or informally
punished is relatively low.
De￿ne A as the sum of the citizen￿ s and the o¢ cial￿ s moral costs: A =
(as+ab). As the intrinsic moral costs of citizen and o¢ cial are independently
distributed according to a uniform distribution over the interval [1;a], it
follows that A is distributed according to a triangular distribution over the
interval [A;A] where A = 2a = 2 and A = 2a. Then the proportion of
corrupt people, or corrupt transactions, in the population, x, is implicitly
de￿ned as:
x = F[y ￿ q + 2x] (2)
where F is the cumulative distribution of a triangular distribution de-
￿ned over the interval [2;2a], and with median equal to (a + 1).
73.1 Possible equilibria under perfect information
The proportion of corrupt transactions or corrupt people that we observe in
equilibrium depends on: the distribution of the internalized moral cost ai
over the population of citizens and o¢ cials, the lowest and highest values
that ai can assume, the bene￿t that corruption generates to the citizen, y,
and the administrative cost that the o¢ cial needs to sustain to provide the
corrupt service, q. We can distinguish four cases.
Case 1. Systemic corruption: The situation where everybody is cor-
rupt, x = 1, can be sustained as an equilibrium if:
A ￿ y ￿ q + 2; (3)
that is, even the moral costs of the ￿most intrinsically honest￿citizen-
o¢ cial pair in the society are not large enough to oppose the incentives
associated with corruption when the whole population is behaving corruptly.
The condition above suggests that we are more likely to observe x = 1 in
equilibrium when the net bene￿t generated by corruption (y￿q) is relatively
large, i.e. when the administrative cost to provide the service is relatively
small (the discretionary power of the public o¢ cial is relatively high) and/or
the bene￿t to the private citizen is relatively large. Society is also more likely
to be trapped in a systemic corruption equilibrium when the highest possible
moral cost generated by corruption in the society is relatively small.
Case 2. Honesty: The situation where everybody is honest, i.e. x = 0,
can be sustained as an equilibrium if:
A = 2 ￿ y ￿ q: (4)
that is, even the moral costs of the ￿most intrinsically corrupt￿citizen-
o¢ cial pair, those with the moral cost equal to a = 1, are larger than or
equal to the net bene￿t associated with corruption when everybody in the
population is behaving honestly. The condition for honesty suggests that we
are more likely to observe x = 0 in equilibrium when the net bene￿t gener-
ated by corruption (y ￿ q) is relatively small, i.e. when the administrative
cost to provide the service is relatively large (the discretionary power on the
public o¢ cial is relatively small) and/or the bene￿t to the private citizen is
8relatively small. Society is also more likely to permanently stay in a honesty
equilibrium when the lowest possible moral cost associated with corruption
is relatively large.
Case 3. Honesty, systemic corruption and interior equilibria: Both a
corruption and a honesty equilibrium exist i⁄:
A ￿ 2 ￿ y ￿ q ￿ 2: (5)
Moreover, if (5) is satis￿ed we also have at least one interior corruption
equilibrium x* which satis￿es:
x* = F[y ￿ q + 2x*]: (6)
Condition (5) suggests that we are more likely to observe multiple equi-
libria when the highest possible moral cost generated by corruption, a, is
relatively small and when the net bene￿t from corruption (y ￿ q) is also
relatively small. Figure 1 illustrates the three corruption equilibria, x = 0,
x = 1, and x = x*, keeping our assumption of f(￿) being a triangular distri-
bution.9 It is straightforward to see that the interior equilibrium is unstable,
as follows: if the proportion of corrupt people is larger than x*, the process
converges to the systemic corruption equilibrium, whereas if the proportion
of corrupt people is smaller than x* the process converges to the honesty
equilibrium. To see why, assume that x = x*+￿, for small positive ￿. Since
due to strategic complementarities a higher proportion of corrupt people in
the population lowers the total cost associated with corruption, the proba-
bility that a corrupt transaction will take place, F(y￿q+2x), is now greater
than the actual proportion of corrupt people, x. This causes the proportion
of corrupt people to increase. The process continues until x reaches the sys-
temic corruption equilibrium. A similar process, in the opposite direction,
holds if x = x*￿￿:











Case 4. Interior corruption equilibria: Neither ￿full honesty￿ nor
￿systemic corruption￿can be sustained in equilibrium i⁄:
A ￿ 2 > y ￿ q > 2; (7)
If the above condition is satis￿ed we have at least one interior corruption
equilibrium x* which satis￿es:
x*= F[y ￿ q + 2x*]
Figure 2 shows that when x = 1 the F[y ￿ q + 2x] curve is now below
the 45 degree line. This is because A > y ￿ q + 2, which means that at
least the most intrinsically honest citizens and public o¢ cials now abstain
from corruption even when x = 1. On the other hand, when x = 0, the
F[y ￿ q + 2x] is now above the 45 degree line. This is because 2 < y ￿ q;
which means that at least the most intrinsically corrupt citizens and public
o¢ cials now engage in corruption even when x = 0. We could still have
multiple equilibria, as shown in Figure 2, however the equilibria would all
be interior. Moreover, as in Case 3, only the highest and lowest corruption
equilibria (x1 and x3 in the ￿gure) would be stable. To see why, let￿ s look
at x1 and assume that x = x1+￿, for small positive ￿. Now, the probability
10that a corrupt transaction will take place, F(y ￿ q + 2x), is lower than
the actual proportion of corrupt people, x. This causes the proportion of
corrupt people to decrease. The process continues until the proportion of
corrupt people reaches x1. A similar process, in the opposite direction, holds
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Figure 2
3.2 Comparative statics
As seen in equations (1) to (7) the values of y, q, as and ab, as well as the
initial level of corruption, determine the corruption equilibrium to which so-
ciety will converge. From equation (1) we saw that the greater the monetary
bene￿t to the briber, y, the smaller the administrative cost required to pro-
vide the corrupt service, q, the smaller the moral costs of briber and bribee,
as and ab, the larger the proportion of corrupt people in the population, x
(as this a⁄ects the total cost associated with corruption), the more likely it
is that a corrupt transaction will take place. We can now investigate which
policies could be e⁄ective in reducing corruption.
First of all, acting on the severity of the penalty or the probability that
a corrupt pair will be discovered would not be necessarily e⁄ective in this
11framework. Recall that the expected cost of formal and informal punishment
enters the cost function through the proportion of corrupt people, x, due to
the presence of strategic complementarities in both the extrinsic incentives
and the intrinsic motivations associated with corruption. Our setting im-
plies that the e⁄ectiveness of anti-corruption policies aimed at increasing the
probability that a corrupt citizen (briber) or a corrupt o¢ cial (bribee) will
be discovered and severely punished depends on how corrupt society already
is. If the level of corruption is high, increasing the penalty associated with
corruption is likely to be ine⁄ective. This is due to the fact that potential
bribers and bribees would still believe that the likelihood for them to be
discovered is very low and that, even in the unlikely case of detection they
could still escape the severe sanction through bribery. Similarly, increasing
the probability that corrupt people will be detected, for example by increas-
ing the number of o¢ cials in charge of vertical and horizontal controls in
public o¢ ces, may also prove ine⁄ective when the level of corruption is high,
since potential bribers and bribees would expect the inspecting o¢ cials to
be willing to accept bribes themselves, in exchange for turning a blind eye.
Our setting suggests that an e⁄ective anti-corruption measure would be
to increase the administrative cost of providing the corrupt service, by low-
ering the discretionary power of the public o¢ cer, for example by clarifying
or simplifying the rules and the regulations associated with public service
delivery. Indeed, equation (1) suggests that an increase in q would reduce
the likelihood for a corrupt agreement to take place. The increase in q
could make at least the most intrinsically honest citizens and o¢ cials in the
population turn from corruption to honesty.
Figure 3 shows how, in a situation of multiple corruption equilibria, an
increase in q would shift the F[y ￿ q + 2x] curve to the right, causing the
unstable interior equilibrium to increase, that is reducing the ￿jump￿needed
in order for society to move from the systemic corruption to the honesty
equilibrium. A large enough increase in q could ultimately eliminate both
the systemic corruption equilibrium and the interior unstable equilibrium,
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Figure 4 shows the e⁄ect of an increase in the administrative cost of
providing the corrupt service in the presence of multiple interior corruption
equilibria. The shift of the F[y￿q+2x] curve to the right would in this case
move the highest corruption equilibrium further from x = 1 and the lowest
corruption equilibrium closer to x = 0, and could ultimately eliminate the
high corruption equilibrium. An alternative or complementary way of escap-
ing a high corruption trap would be to modify the distribution of the moral
cost associated with corruption in the society, such that for any given level of
y, q and x, the monetary incentives of fewer briber-bribee pairs will be high
enough to compensate for the higher intrinsic costs generated by corruption.
For instance, public awareness campaigns and educational programs able to
increase the moral cost ai of any individual i in the population by a positive
fraction z, would shift the cumulative distribution function of (as+ab), in a
similar way as depicted in Figure 3 and Figure 4, for any given y, q and x.
This would result in either a higher unstable interior corruption equilibrium,
i.e. a smaller ￿jump￿required to move from the high corruption to the low
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4 Bribery under uncertainty
Consider a society where, while each individual is aware of how costly it
would be for him or her to be involved in corruption, there is imperfect
information with respect to the intrinsic moral cost that his or her opponent
would su⁄er if they engage in corruption; in other words, individuals are
uncertain about the corruptibility of their opponent.
Formally, we now assume that individuals know their own total and in-
trinsic costs associated with corruption, yet they only know the distribution
of their opponent￿ s intrinsic moral cost over the interval [1, a]. This implies
that each agent is aware that his or her opponent￿ s total cost associated
with corruption is uniformly distributed over the interval [1 ￿ x, a ￿ x], for
any given x. We set 1 ￿ x = c and a ￿ x = c for convenience.
We assume that citizen and o¢ cial simultaneously decide the amounts
of the bribe, bb and bs, that they will use as their reservation bribes when
bargaining over the corrupt transaction.10 A corrupt transaction occurs if
and only if the bribe ￿submitted￿by the private citizen, bb, is higher than
10This assumption allows us to look at both the citizen￿ s and the o¢ cial￿ s willingness
to engage in corruption independently from their active (i.e. ￿rst-mover) or passive (i.e.
second-mover) role in the transaction.
14or equal to the bribe ￿submitted￿by the public o¢ cial, bs. Therefore, the
citizen and the o¢ cial face a trade-o⁄between acting aggressively on the one
hand ￿i.e. ￿submitting￿a low bribe for the citizen and ￿submitting￿a high
bribe for the o¢ cial in order to make higher pro￿ts in case of agreement ￿
and, on the other hand, lowering the risk of disagreement ￿i.e. ￿submitting￿
a bribe close to the reservation bribe.
If the conditions for a transaction to take place are met, citizen and
o¢ cial negotiate the ￿nal amount of the bribe in the range of mutually
agreeable bribes. The ￿nal bribe is equal to b = kbb + (1 ￿ k)bs, with
0 ￿ k ￿ 1, where k represents the bargaining power of the private citizen
relative to the bargaining power of the public o¢ cial. We are ultimately
interested in the extreme scenarios corresponding to symmetric bargaining
powers, i.e. k = 1=2, and perfectly asymmetric bargaining powers, i.e. k = 0
or k = 1.11
Citizen and o¢ cial choose bb and bs to maximize their expected gains
from corruption; bb and bs represent their Bayesian strategy. An individual
i￿ s Bayesian strategy bi is de￿ned as bi = Bi(ci), indicating that for any
given y and q the bribe that an agent declares to be willing to pay or take
depends on his own intrinsic moral cost, i.e. his ￿type￿ , as ci determines
the reservation price vi. An agent i￿ s strategy bi constitutes a best response
strategy if for any ci the ￿submitted￿ bribe bi is a best response to his
corruption partner￿ s Bayesian strategy. Any pair of best response strategies
constitutes a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
The citizen-o¢ cial game has many Bayesian Nash equilibria. However,
we are ultimately interested in the equilibrium level of corruption in the
society as a whole. Therefore a ￿corruption equilibrium￿ , x*, in our model
is de￿ned as the fraction of corrupt citizen-o¢ cial pairs/transactions which
satis￿es the following two conditions:
1) In the citizen-o¢ cial Bayesian game, given x*:
(i) the citizen plays a best response strategy to the o¢ cial￿ s Bayesian
strategy;
(ii) the o¢ cial plays a best response strategy to the citizen￿ s Bayesian
strategy;
2) The induced proportion of corrupt citizen-o¢ cial pairs in the popu-
lation, is consistent with x*; x = Prob[(citizen bribesjx*)\(o¢ cial takes a
bribejx*)].
We investigate the corruption equilibria when the private citizen and the
11All the intermediate bargaining power cases are not as interesting, as the results in
terms of corruption are ￿in between￿the extreme cases results.
15public o¢ cial ￿submit￿their bribes, bb and bs, by adopting linear strategies
in their private valuations of the corrupt service,12 as follows:
1) bb = ￿ + ￿(vb) = ￿ + ￿(y ￿ cb)
2) bs = ￿ + ￿(vs) = ￿ + ￿(q + cs)
The private citizen chooses bb to maximize his expected gain from cor-
ruption, Ub, which is equal to the monetary gain he would get from corrup-
tion minus the (expected) ￿nal bribe that he would have to pay in case of
agreement with the o¢ cial, times the probability that an agreement will be
reached:
Ub(b;cb;y) = Pr(bb ￿ bs)[y ￿ cb ￿ kbb ￿ (1 ￿ k)E(bsjbs ￿ bb)]:
Note that E(bsjbs ￿ bb) represents the bribe that the citizen expects
the o¢ cial to ask, conditional on this asked bribe being lower than what
the citizen would be willing to pay, i.e. the condition for a transaction to
occur needs to be met. Recall that cs is uniformly distributed over the
interval [c;c]. It follows that bs is uniformly distributed over the interval
[￿ + ￿(q + c);￿ + ￿(q + c)], which gives:
Ub(b;cb;y;q) =
bb￿￿￿￿(q+c)





@bb = 0 and solving for bb, we obtain the best response




[￿ + ￿(q + c)] +
1
k + 1
(y ￿ cb): (8)
We now turn to the public o¢ cial. He chooses bs to maximize his ex-
pected gain from corruption, Us; which is equal to the (expected) ￿nal bribe
that he/she would receive in case of agreement minus the administrative
cost he would have to sustain to provide the service, times the probability
that an agreement will be reached:
Us(b;cs;y;q) = Pr(bb ￿ bs)[(1 ￿ k)bs + kE(bbjbb ￿ bs) ￿ cs ￿ q]:
12Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) show that adopting linear strategies in a standard
double auction generates the highest probability for trade to occur under imperfect in-
formation. By assuming linear strategies in our double auction model of bribery we are
therefore considering the worst case scenario with respect to the resulting level of corrup-
tion.
16As before, E(bbjbb ￿ bs) represents the bribe that the o¢ cial expects the
citizen to o⁄er in exchange for the corrupt service, conditional on this o⁄er
being larger than the bribe the o¢ cial would be willing to take. Since cb is
uniformly distributed over the interval [c;c]; then bb is uniformly distributed
over the interval [￿ + ￿(y ￿ c);￿ + ￿(y ￿ c)], which gives:
Us(b;cs;q) =
￿+￿(y￿c)￿bs
￿(c￿c) [(1 ￿ k)bs + k
￿+￿(y￿c)+bs
2 ￿ cs ￿ q]:
Setting @Us
@bs = 0 and solving for bs, we obtain the best response strategy




[￿ + ￿(y ￿ c)] +
1
2 ￿ k
(q + cs): (9)
From (8) and (9), solving for ￿ and ￿, we derive the equilibrium linear
strategies of the citizen and the public o¢ cial:
1) bb = ￿ + ￿(vb) =
k(1￿k)
2(k+1)(y ￿ 1 + x) + k
2(q + 1 ￿ x) + 1
k+1(y ￿ cb);
2) bs = ￿ +￿(vs) =
k(1￿k)
2(2￿k)(q +1￿x)+ 1￿k
2 (y ￿1+x)+ 1
2￿k(q +cs);







(y ￿ q) + (1 + k)x +
k2 ￿ k + 1
2 ￿ k
: (10)
We focus on the levels of corruption corresponding to the bargaining
power ￿lower￿ and ￿upper bounds￿ : 1) equal bargaining power of citizen
and o¢ cial with respect to the bribery transaction, i.e. k = 1=2, and 2)
asymmetric bargaining power with k = 0. Results for the case k = 1 are
symmetric to the results obtained for case 2. The intermediate cases, i.e.
those corresponding to 0 < k < 1=2, and 1=2 < k < 0 do not provide
additional information, as they generate results which are ￿in between￿those
corresponding to the lower and the upper bounds.
174.1 Imperfect information with k = 1=2
When k = 1=2 the private citizen and the public o¢ cial have equal bar-
gaining power in negotiating the amount of the bribe, which implies that
the ￿nal bribe paid by a corrupt citizen and received by a corrupt o¢ cial is
equal to b = 1
2bb + 1
2bs: From (10) a corruption agreement takes place if and
only if:
ab + as ￿
3
4



















Recall that F is the cumulative distribution function of A = (ab + as),
and A is distributed according to a triangular distribution over the interval
[2;2a].
A comparison of the equilibrium levels of corruption under perfect and
imperfect information, i.e. equations (2) and (12), suggests that the propor-
tion of corrupt citizen-o¢ cial pairs in the society is lower under imperfect
information as long as 2 < y ￿ q + 2x, i.e. the most intrinsically corrupt
citizen and o¢ cial in the population (those with ab = as = 1) ￿nd it optimal
to agree on a corrupt exchange, for any given x.
We now look at the possible corruption equilibria under imperfect infor-
mation.





(y ￿ q) + 2: (13)
The comparison between conditions (13) and (3) suggests that the like-
lihood for society to be trapped in a systemic corruption equilibrium is
relatively lower when the agents do not have perfect information about each
other￿ s ￿intrinsic corruptibility￿(and have equal bargaining power).
Case 2. Honesty, x = 0 can be sustained as an equilibrium if:
182 ￿ 3
4(y ￿ q) + 1
2;
or, equivalently,
2 ￿ (y ￿ q);
which is the same as condition (4). It follows that the likelihood for
honesty to be an equilibrium does not depend on the agents￿information
about their opponent￿ s corruptibility.
Case 3. Honesty, systemic corruption and interior equilibria. Honesty
and systemic corruption can now be observed in equilibrium i⁄:
4
3
(A ￿ 2) ￿ y ￿ q ￿ 2: (14)
Comparing conditions (14) and (5) suggests that when individuals are
uncertain about their opponent￿ s intrinsic corruptibility (and have equal
bargaining power), society is less likely to be characterized by multiple cor-
ruption equilibria. Note that the interior unstable equilibrium x* now sat-
is￿es:
x*= F[3
4(y ￿ q) + 3
2x*+1
2]
Figure 5 shows the three corruption equilibria under perfect and im-
perfect information, given that 4
3(A ￿ 2) ￿ y ￿ q ￿ 2. Although the
F[3
4(y ￿ q) + 3
2x + 1
2] and the F[y ￿ q + 2x] curves both intersect the 45
degree line at x = 0 and x = 1, the F[3
4(y ￿ q) + 3
2x + 1
2] is weakly below
the F[y ￿ q + 2x] curve when it crosses the 45 degree line.13 It follows that
the interior unstable equilibrium under imperfect information, ximp in the
￿gure, corresponds to a larger proportion of corrupt people compared to the
interior equilibrium under perfect information, xp in the ￿gure. However, as
the interior equilibria are unstable, ximp greater than xp implies that when
society is trapped in the systemic corruption equilibrium, a relatively smaller
￿jump￿is required in order for the process to converge toward the honesty
equilibrium. Equivalently, a relatively smaller increase in the administrative
13In fact the F[y ￿ q + 2x] curve can be above the F[
3





small values of x and large values of (y ￿ q).
19cost q and a smaller positive shift of the distribution of the moral costs of
citizens and/or public o¢ cials is required in order to eliminate the systemic
corruption equilibrium and ultimately the interior corruption equilibrium.
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x, F





F[3/4 (y – q)+3/2x +1/2]
Figure 5
Case 4. Interior corruption equilibria. At least one interior equilib-
rium can now be observed if:
2 < y ￿ q <
4
3
(A ￿ 2); (15)
whereas under perfect information the condition for interior equilibria
was 2 < y ￿ q < A ￿ 2, which suggests that imperfect information about
one￿ s opponent intrinsic moral cost associated with corruption increases the
likelihood for society to be characterized by multiple interior corruption
equilibria. Interior equilibria, x*, now satisfy:
x*= F[3
4(y ￿ q) + 3
2x*+1
2]
20Figure 6 shows multiple interior equilibria under perfect and imperfect
information, given that 2 < y ￿ q < A ￿ 2 is satis￿ed.
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Figure 6
Three results clearly emerge from Figure 6. First of all, the high corrup-
tion equilibrium society could be trapped in is always lower under imperfect
information than under perfect information. Secondly, the low corruption
equilibrium which society could be driven to is always lower under imperfect
information than under perfect information. Finally, the unstable corrup-
tion equilibrium, i.e. the critical proportion of corrupt people below which
the process would converge to the low corruption equilibrium, is larger under
imperfect information, suggesting that it is relatively easier/less costly for
society to escape the high corruption equilibrium when agents are uncertain
about each other￿ s moral costs generated by corruption. Additionally, any
policy aimed at reducing corruption, for instance by decreasing the discre-
tionary power of the public o¢ cial or shifting the distribution of the moral
costs of citizens and/or o¢ cials, would be relatively more e⁄ective under
imperfect information than under perfect information.
214.2 Imperfect information with k = 0
We now investigate the decision of citizens and o¢ cials to engage in bribery
when the private citizen has no bargaining power with respect to the amount
of the bribe. In this setting, if corruption takes place, i.e. bb ￿ bs, the citizen
will pay the bribe demanded by the o¢ cial:
b = bs = 1
2(y + q + as ￿ 1)
From (10), a corruption agreement takes place if and only if:
2ab + as ￿ y ￿ q + 2x + 1 (16)
which implicitly de￿nes the proportion of corrupt citizen-o¢ cial pairs in
the population as:14
x = ￿[y ￿ q + 2x + 1] (17)
where ￿(￿) is the cumulative distribution function of E = (2as + ab);




Recall condition (3) for a corruption agreement to take place under per-
fect information:
ab + as < y ￿ q + 2x
Comparing conditions (3) and (16) suggests that a bribery agreement is
less likely to take place under imperfect information (and all the bargaining
power on the o¢ cial￿ s side) than under perfect information if and only if the
private citizen￿ s intrinsic moral cost is larger than the lowest possible moral
cost in the society, i.e. ab > a = 1, which is always true. A comparison of
the conditions for corruption to take place under imperfect information with
equal bargaining powers, ab + as ￿ 3
4(y ￿ q) + 3
2x + 1
2; and under imperfect
information with asymmetric bargaining powers, 2ab + as ￿ y ￿ q + 2x + 1;
14Note that under imperfect information and no bargaining power on the citizen￿ s side,
the intrinsic moral cost of the private citizen plays a relatively larger role in the bribe-
agreement process.
22does not provide us with straightforward insights, and requires a deeper look
at the speci￿c distribution functions.
We now look at the possible corruption equilibria under imperfect infor-
mation and k = 0.
Case 1. Systemic corruption, x = 1, can now be sustained as an
equilibrium if:
3a ￿ y ￿ q + 3 (18)
Under perfect information the condition for systemic corruption to be
an equilibrium was 2a ￿ y ￿ q + 2, whereas under imperfect information
and equal bargaining power between the parts the condition for systemic
corruption was 2a ￿ 3
4(y￿q)+2: This suggests that society is least likely to
be trapped in a systemic corruption equilibrium when the agents have im-
perfect information about each other￿ s intrinsic willingness to act corruptly
and the bargaining power is placed on one side of the market only.
Case 2. Honesty, x = 0 can be sustained as an equilibrium if:
3 ￿ y ￿ q + 1
or, equivalently,
2 ￿ y ￿ q
which is the same condition for a honesty equilibrium to be sustained
under both perfect information and imperfect information with k = 1=2:
Case 3. Multiple equilibria. Honesty and systemic corruption can now
be both observed in equilibrium i⁄:
3a ￿ 3 ￿ y ￿ q ￿ 2: (19)
A comparison with conditions (5) and (14) suggests that society is least
likely to be characterised by multiple corruption equilibria when individuals
have imperfect information about each other￿ s corruptibility and the bar-
gaining power over the amount to be bribed is perfectly asymmetric. Note
that the interior unstable equilibrium x* now satis￿es:
23x*= ￿(y ￿ q + 2x*+1)
Figure 7 illustrates three corruption equilibria under perfect informa-
tion, imperfect information with k = 1=2 and imperfect information with
k = 0, assuming that 3a ￿ 3 ￿ y ￿ q ￿ 2. Although honesty and systemic
corruption are both sustained as equilibria in the three cases, the interior
unstable corruption equilibria signi￿cantly di⁄er. As we already pointed out
in Section 4.1, when potential bribers and bribees are uncertain about each
other￿ s corruptibility, society is characterized by a higher interior corrup-
tion equilibrium than under perfect information. Moreover, Figure 7 shows
that the interior equilibrium under imperfect information is higher the more
asymmetric the bargaining power between the briber and the bribee, which
implies that escaping from a systemic corruption trap is relatively easier or
less costly when individuals are uncertain about each other￿ s intrinsic cor-
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Case 4. Interior corruption equilibria. At least one stable interior
corruption equilibrium can now be observed i⁄:
242 < y ￿ q < 3a ￿ 3: (20)
Comparing condition (20) with conditions (7) and (15) suggests that
society is most likely to end up in an interior corruption equilibrium un-
der imperfect information and perfectly asymmetric bargaining power. The
interior equilibria, x*, satisfy.
x* = ￿[y ￿ q + 2x* + 1] (21)
Figure 8 shows the interior corruption equilibria in the three cases. Once
again, the ￿gure suggests that it is relatively easier or less costly for society
to move from a high corruption to a low corruption interior equilibrium in
the presence of imperfect information, and even more so when the bribee
(or the briber) has full bargaining power over the amount to be bribed.15
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15For any level of bargaining power in between the upper bound of k = 1=2 and the
lower bound of k = 0, we would have a cumulative distribution function lying in between
the F(:) and the ￿(:) distribution functions depicted in Figure 5.8. In other words, for any
level of corruption x, the probability that a citizen-o¢ cial pair will engage in corruption
when 0 < k < 1=2 would be lower than the probability corresponding to k = 1=2 and
higher than the probability corresponding to k = 0.
255 Concluding remarks
This paper uses a simple double auction model to study the strategic in-
teraction between potential bribers and potential bribees and the resulting
corruption equilibria. We assume that the decision to engage in bribery
is subject to strategic complementarities and that individuals are heteroge-
neous with respect to the intrinsic moral cost associated with corruption.
The double auction framework allows us to look at the corruption decision
making of both the briber and the bribee rather than focusing only on one
side of the market, as has been traditionally done in the literature. We
investigate how uncertainty regarding the intrinsic corruptibility of one￿ s
potential corruption partner a⁄ects the decision to engage in bribery and
the resulting overall level of corruption.
We found that when individuals are uncertain with respect to their op-
ponent￿ s intrinsic corruptibility, they are less likely to engage in corruption.
Imperfect information reduces the likelihood for society to end up in a sys-
temic corruption trap and increases the likelihood for society to be character-
ized by multiple interior equilibria. Moreover, when society is characterized
by multiple equilibria, imperfect information makes it relatively easier for
society to ￿jump￿ from a high corruption to a low corruption or honesty
equilibrium. This implies that any reduction in the equilibrium proportion
of corrupt people can be achieved at a lower cost. This is especially true
when the briber and bribee di⁄er in their bargaining power over the amount
to be bribed. Indeed, the lowest probability that society will end up in a
￿corruption trap￿corresponds to a situation where citizens and o¢ cials have
imperfect information about each other￿ s corruptibility and all the bargain-
ing power is placed on either the o¢ cial￿ s or the citizen￿ s side, since, while
monopoly power places either the citizen or the o¢ cial in the position of
extracting higher gains from corruption, at the same time it increases the
chance for a transaction not to occur.
Our ￿ndings have interesting policy implications. It is reasonable to
believe that uncertainty is lower in environments where the social distance
among bribers and bribees is relatively small, i.e. where bribers and bribees
are more likely to personally know each other or have indirect information
about each other￿ s corruptibility (see Tanzi, 2005). Our results therefore sug-
gest that corruption can be lowered by increasing the social distance between
briber and bribee, and therefore provide theoretical support against e⁄orts
to decentralize public service provision, and in favour of anti-corruption
measures, such as sta⁄-rotation in public o¢ ces, aimed at inducing as much
uncertainty as possible with respect to the corruptibility of both buyers and
26sellers of public services.
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